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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
R.A Y D. \YILLIA~IS, ~-\. e. ~IlXER, 
~fl~L\. THO~L\S, IL~-\ THO:JI)~;-.; 
LA:JIBERT, P. P. T H 0 :JI AS, 
~IAX TIIO~IA::-;, JOSEPH HAX-
SOX, ROLAXD J. HAXSON and 
ROY H~-\XSON, partners under the 
name of ELBERTA LAND AND 
\VATER CO~IPANY, 
Plaintiffs and AppeUants 
vs. 
OREN E. B--:\.RXEY and THEL~IA 
BARNEY, his wife. THE BANK 
OF SPANISH FORK, a corpora-
tion; and UTAH COUNTY, a body 
politic and corporate of the State 
of UTAH, 
Defendants ·and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 7336 
The plaintiffs are partners doing business as the 
Elberta Land and Water Company succeeding a former 
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partnership of the same name which had included Charles 
T. Dixon and A. T. Money but did not include plaintiffs 
Mirna Thomas and Roy Hanson. Plaintiffs sue to quiet 
title to certain lands situated in Utah County. The an-
swering defendants Oren E. Barney and Thelma Barney, 
his wife, by their answer disclaim as to all of the property 
except the following: 
East one-half of the East one-half and the 
Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 6, Township 11 South, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake }f eridian. 
On the land described above, the answering defen-
dants denied the claims of title and poss·ession or right 
of possession of the plaintiffs and counterclaim in two 
causes of action to have title quieted in said answering 
defendants. 
The plaintiffs received their title from the following 
sources: 
a. From Lewis Thompson and wife to Utah Valley 
Land and Water Company by deed (plaintiffs' Exhibit 
"C") dated February 26, 1920 (no question was raised 
as to the right of the grantors in Exhibit '' C'' to pass 
good title and no question with regard to the title· ante-
dating the said Exhibit was presented). 
b. Certificate of Sale under foreclosure by the First 
Security Bank of Provo (plaintiffs' Exhibit "D") 
against Utah Valley Land and Water Company, et al, 
dated November 21, 1933. 
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e. As~ign1nent of the foregoing certificate by the 
bank to the Colorado DeYelopinent Company, a corpora-
tion (plaintiffs' Exhibit "E ") dated August 3, 1934. 
d. Sheriff's Deed to Colorado Development Com-
pany, a corporation, (plaintiffs' Exhibit "F") dated 
Augn~t 16, 1934. 
e. Quitclaim Deed (plaintiffs' Exhibit "G") from 
Colorado Development Company, a corporation, to 0. A. 
Penrod dated November 27,1937. 
f. Quitclailn Deed (plaintiffs' Exhibit "H") from 
0. A. Penrod and wife to the Commercial Bank of Span-
ish Fork dated January 11, 1938, and recorded on Decem-
ber 29, 1944, in the office of the County Recorder of Utah 
County, Utah. 
g. Quitclaim Deed (plaintiffs' Exhibit "I") from 
P. P. Thomas and :Mirna Thomas, his wife, Joseph Han-
son, widower, and the Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork 
to Elberta Land and Water Company, a partnership, the 
plaintiff herein, dated l\farch 29, 1945, and recorded on 
March 29, 1945, in the office of the County Recorder of 
Utah County, Utah. 
The answering defendants Oren E. Barney and Thel-
ma Barney claim the land by virtue of Auditor's Tax 
Deed (defendant's Exhibit 3) and quitclaim deeds dated 
November 3, 1941 from Utah County, (defendants' Ex-
hibits 1 and 2), which deeds the defendants admitted were 
invalid because of the failure to advertise the May sale 
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4 
for the required twenty-eight days and the ahRence of 
the affidavit from the tax rolls. (T. 77-78). 
The defendants pleaded two further affirmative de-
fenses and counter-claims which they maintained pre-
vented the plaintiffs from asserting title as against the 
defendant and which they claimed would require the 
court to quiet title in defendants. 
The first cause of counterelaim alleges that the iands 
in issue were conveyed to 0. A. Penrod by the Colorado 
Development Company by quit claim deed upon Penrod's 
payment to it of $2500, which sum, or the greater part 
thereof, was supplied to him by the Commercial Bank of 
Spanish Fork by and through P. P. Thomas, one of the 
piaintiffs, and that on or about December 8, 1937, P. P. 
Thomas and 0. A. Penrod advised the users of water of 
the old Utah Valley Land & Water Company, which in-
cluded these defendants, that if they, 'the users, would 
repay the $2500 advanced by the Commercial Bank of 
Spanish Fork, that they could have the property pur-
chased by Penrod from the Colorado Development Com-
. pany, and that assessments were levied against the water 
users from which the bank was paid in full, and there-
upon the defendants, with the other water users, became 
entitled to the purchases made by Penrod including the 
described lands. That rut that time the lands had been 
sold to Utah County for taxes, and that thereafter 0. A. 
Penrod purchased some of the same lands from Utah 
County, and that under these facts, the plaintiffs now 
have no equitabie right to claim the lands in issue. 
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The serond eause of eonnterrlaim set~ up that prior 
to the purchase of the land~ frmn the Colorado Develop-
ment Con1pany 0. ~~. Penrod was a. Inember of a. commit-
tee of resident::; of Elberta, Utah, and 8Urrounding terri-
tory, to inYestip;a te the possibilities of acquiring the 
water rights of the Utah Yalley Land & Water Company, 
and the land of the Colorado Developn1ent Company, 
"·hich was for1nerly irrigated by such water, and as such 
obtained an option to purchas·e, and thereafter did ac-
quire all of the "·ater rights of the Utah Valley Land & 
"' ater Company and certain of the lands held by the Col-
orado Development Company, all of which had previously 
been sold to Utah County for delinquent taxes. Some of 
the land purchased by Penrod had not previously been, 
and no ,,·ater could be supplied from the system as it wa~ 
constructed. That Penrod, with the financial help of P. 
P. Thomas, as president of the Commercial Bank of 
Spanish Fork, purchased from U·tah County much of the 
land that had been formerly irrigated by the sys1t:em con-
veyed to Penrod by the Utah Valley Land & Water Com-
pany, and that thereafter, on or about June 3, 1940, while 
he was still record owner of the lands in question here, 
and at a meeting with the County Commission of Utah 
County, Penrod informed a committee of the land owners 
that he and his associates had bought all the land they 
wanted from Utah County and that the people living in 
and about Elberta could go ahead and buy from the 
county the balance of the land that had been sold to him 
h~· the Colorado Development Company and which had 
been sold to Utah County for delinquent taxes. That in 
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reliance upon the statement and representation of Pen-
rod, defendants purchased the land in issue here under 
a contract from the county, and upon completion of pay-
ment received the county's deeds, and that now the plain-
tiffs as remote grantees from Penrod are estopped from 
asserting any claim to the property, or that the tax pro-
cedure under which defendants purchased was invalid. 
The plaintiffs pres·ented their documentary evidence 
through exhibits by stipulations of the parties and then 
rested. The defendants then put on evidence both by doc-
uments and oral testimony. At the conclusion of defen-
dants' testimony and after def·endants rested, plaintiffs 
moved the court for an order dismissing the affirmative 
answers and counter-claims of the def·endants and for 
judgment on the complaint (T. 75-76) which motion the 
court denied. 
The court found that the plaintiffs were not bonafide 
purchas·ers without notice and for value of the land in 
issue and were estopped to set up the claim that the quit-
claim deeds from Utah County conveying the land to the 
defendants are invalid and that the plaintiffs and each 
of them are estopped to claim the land involved in this 
action. The court thereupon entered it~ decree in favor 
of the defendants and against the plain1tiffs and decreed 
that the defendants Or,en E. Barney ·and Thelma Barney, 
his wife, are ~tne own·ers of the property in controversy 
and quieting title in said property in said defendants. 
Defendants we~e awarded costs in the action. 
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Frmn the judg1uent of the District Court plaintiffs 
appeal. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
1. The court erred in denying plaintiffs' motion 
for a dis1nissal of defendants' counter-claims and for 
judg1nent in favor of plaintiffs. 
2. The Findings of Fact (R. 51-55) are not sup-
ported by the evidence. 
3. The Findings of Fact (R. 51-55) do not support 
the Conclusions of Law (R. 5'5-56). 
4. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
are insufficient to support the Decr'e'e (R. 57-58). 
5. The court erred in admitting hearsay testimony 
and other inadmissible evidence on the part of the de-
fendants over objections of the plaintiffs. 
POINTS FOR ARGUMENT 
It is believed that the errors assigned can be best con-
solidated and covered in argument under the following 
headings: 
I. 
The plairntijf s evidence established im them a good title 
and there was no competent evidence sufficient tlo 
defe~at such title. 
(a) The evidence perrrditted to be imtroduced by defen-
dants bo OJtltack pZOJintiffs' title was inadmissable and 
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incom·petent und,er the st,atute of frauds, Sections 
33-5-1 and 33-5-3, Utah Code Annotat,ed, 1943, and 
wa,,· further inadmissable as being ltearsa.y. 
II. 
The findings of ~act ~are not suppo'rted by the evide,nce. 
III. 
The findings of 'fact do no't suppo~rt the f'Onclusions ~of 
Law orr the Decree. 
III. (a) 
There was wo competent evidence sufficienJt1 to raise an es-
toppel in defenwants' favo'r (JJYl,d to t1vus prevent 
plaintiffs from asserting cZaim to the subject pro-
perty or to estop plaintiffs from att·acking the vali-
dity :of defendants' title. 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
The plairntiff s evidence establtished im them a good #itle 
and there 'toas no competent evidenCie sufficient to 
defeat such title. 
There can be no doubt, nor have defendants ever 
questioned, that the ins'truments introduced by plaintiffs 
in support of plaintiffs' title we:ve amp:le and sufficient 
to establish title in them unless for some reason they were 
estopped from asserting their ti!tlle. This was recognized 
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hy the rourt in it~ menwrandun1 opinion. (Record 38). 
Tlw record and plaintiffB' exhibits "C,'' "D," "E," 
"F," dG,'' '"H," and "I" speak for themselves and 
dearly estahli~h in the plaintiffs' a good title to the 
property. It is belieYed that no argument need be made 
with regard to this particular phase of the case, except 
a~ coYered under o'ther headings herein. 
I (a). 
The eridence permi.tted to be in,troduced by the defen-
dants to attack plaintiffs' title was inadmiss·able and 
incompetent under the sbalute of frauds, 'Sections 
33-5-1 and 33-5-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and 
u·as further inadmissable as being he,arsay. 
During the course of the trial the defendants were 
permitted to introduce evidence and testimony at various 
times with regard to conversations had by the defendants 
with persons other than the plaintiffs, or any of them, 
and outside the presence of the plaintiffs, or any of them. 
(T. 37-39, -1-7, 65). 
Testimony was permitted to be given by Va:leria 
Bauer that at a meeting of county commissioners on June 
3, 1940, attended by s·everal persons, not including any 
party to this action, 0. A. Penrod stated that he and his 
partners had all the land they now desired. (T. 37-39). 
Exeerpts from the minutes of such meeting were also 
permitted to be introduced. (T. 47). Earl Barney (the 
father of the defendant Oren E. Barney) was ::P·resent 
at such meeting and was permitted to testify concerning 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
conversations and happenings there. ( T. 50). Later the 
defendant Oren E. Barney was permitted to testify con-
cerning statements his father made to him as to conver-
sations a 1t said meeting. (T. 65-67). 
As above stated, at no time was any party to this 
action present at any such meeting or when any such 
conversations allegedly took place. Clearly such testi-
mony was inad1nissable as hearsay and cannot in any way 
bind these plaintiffs. True in several instances in connec-
tion with the admission of such testimony, and in fact 
other very questionable testimony, the court indicated that 
the admissibility of .such testimony was questionable but 
stated that inasmuch as the case was being tried befor·e a 
judge rather than before a jury it was deemed such tes-
timony would be r·eceived "pro forma" for what it was 
worth and if he did not la:t1er think it was admissable or 
competent or relative he would disregard it. In that con-
nection, while we appreciate the fact that courts are often 
more leni·ent with the admissibility of evidence in a mat-
ter being tried before a judge without a jury, it seems 
to us that in this case such procedure was carried far 
beyond the realms of legal propriety. We submit that 
judges are only human and when a judge, r·egardless of 
his honesty or integrity or his confidence in his own abil-
ity to separate the wheat from the chaff, permits indis-
criminately the admissibility of all kinds of testimony, 
whether relevant or otherwise but which may, if con-
sidered, be persuasive, that such judge no matter how he 
may try does not and cannot erase from his mind the 
effect of such testimony; and where, as here, such an 
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abundance of testinwny wa~ ad1nitted in such a way it 
~eems to us that it wa~ prejudicial PlTor to do so. 
During the course of the trial testilnony was per-
mitted to be introduced concerning promises allegedly 
made by one 0. A. Penrod, the renwte grantor of the 
plaintiff~. at a 1neeting attended by a group of residents 
of Elberta and Yicinity, (of which group the defendants 
were not 1nen1bers) to the effect that if certain payments 
were made by the group of water users attending such 
meeting that such water users could have the property 
purchased by Penrod fron1 the Colorado Development 
Company ("which included the subject property). It was 
alleged that P. P. Thomas was present at such meeting 
and acquiesced in the statements of Penrod, P. P. Thomas 
then and there being president of the Commercial Bank 
of Spanish Fork, which had advanced money with which 
Penrod purchased said property. Under any theory if 
such promises were made they were nothing more than 
verbal promises to transfer an interest in real property 
in the event certain things were done by the water users 
who attended the meeting. Clearly those oral statements 
and agreements, if in fact made, fall wi'thin the statute 
of frauds and were not admissible or competent to esta-
blish any agreem·ent or understanding with regard to 
the transfer or promises to transfer an interest in the 
real property in question. (See Sections 33-5-1 and 33-5-3, 
Utah Ood.e Annotated, 1943.). 
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II. 
The findilngs ~of fa·ct are not su.pp,orted by the evidence. 
Under Finding No. 15 the court, in addition to other 
things, found: ''That 0. A. Penrod aided defendants in 
making their s·election of the land purchased by defen-
dants from Utah County." There is not one word of 
evidence in the entire record to support this finding. In 
fact there is no eviden0e that the defendants ever talked 
with or had any dealings with 0. A. Penrod as to this 
property. All of the evidence is 'to the contrary. Neither 
of the defendants were present at the meeting with the 
commissioners on June 3, 1940. Perhaps the court be-
came confused because there was a man named ''Barney'' 
who was preS'ent at that meeting but that was the father 
of the defendant, namely: Earl Barney .. (T. 37-39 and 50). 
The defendant Oren Barney's testimony is to the effect 
that his wife and father accompanied him to the county 
commission's office when he made his selection of the 
land which he ·purchased ( T. 64) and nowhere is it in-
dicated that Penrod or any of the defendants had any-
thing to do with such selection or were present when it 
was made. 
Under Finding of Fact No. 17 the court found: 
''That the plaintiffs had notice of defendants' 
claim of title through P. P. Thomas, Max 'Thomas 
and Joseph Hanson. '' 
There is absolutely nothing in the ·evidence to support 
such a finding. Now here can any evidence he found which 
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would show that P. P. Thmnas or ~lax Thmnas or Joseph 
Han~on had at any tilne prior to the tin1e the property 
wa~ transferred to plaintiff~ or even at any time prior 
to the con1n1ence1nent of the action known of the repre-
sentations and actions ,~vhich are attributable to 0. A. 
Penrod on June 3, 19-!0. X o one ever testified that Pen-
rod or anyone advised the plaintiffs, or any of them, or 
anyone acting for them as to such statements or activi-
ties of Penrod nor is there any evidence wha:tsoever to 
show that at the time the plaintiffs or their immediate 
grantors received the deed to the property in question 
that plaintiffs had any notice at all of the claim of the 
defendants. 
Under Finding No. 18 the court found as follows: 
•' That P. P. Thomas had knowledge of the 
facts constituting equitable estoppel in favor of 
defendants at the time the Commercial Bank of 
Spanish Fork, P. P. Thomas and wife and Joseph 
Hanson conveyed the property in issue to plain-
tiff as partners.'' 
As will be hereinafter pointed out it is our contention 
that Finding No. 18 is not in any respect a finding of 
fact but is entirely a conclusion of law. This matter, 
however, will be covered in another part of the argument. 
In connection with such finding, however, it should be 
stated that there is absolutely no competent evidence 
to support the finding made. Because of the ambiguity 
of the finding as to just what facts ''constituting an 
equitable estoppel" are referred to, it is difficult to meet 
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this 1natter· squarely. However, for purposes of this part 
of the argument, we must assume that the court referred 
to the representations and statements attributed to 0. A. 
Penrod and to his alleged activities in connection therewith 
on June 3, 1940 when it is contended that Penrod stated 
that he and his ''partners'' or ''workers'' had purchased 
all the land they wanted. With regard to suchm·atterthe re-
cord is absolutely void of any evidence whatsoever indicat-
ing that P. P. Thomas knew of the supposed representa-
tions or statements or conduct of Penrod. If Penrod in fact 
made such statements there is nothing in the record to 
show who was referred to by ''his partners'' or ''work-
ers'' or to show that any of the defendants were included 
or intended by him to be included therein. Even if Pen-
rod had expressly mentioned the plaintiffs or any of them 
as being his "partners" or "workers," such declaration 
hy him would not be competent to establish such relation-
ship. There is no evidence that P. P. 'Thomas or any of 
the plaintiffs or their immediate grantors acquiesced in 
or joined Penrod in connection with such statements or 
agreed or intended to be bound by such statements or 
actions by Penrod. There is nothing to show that deal-
ings previously had by P. P. Thomas and Thomas' asso-
ciates with Penrod were such that Penrod represented 
them or was in any way in a position to speak for them 
or that Penrod was bound to or that he did convey to 
Thomas or his associates any information as to the rep-
resentations which he may have made to the defendants, 
and certainly there is nothing to show that any of the 
defendants were ''partners'' or ''workers'' of Penrod. 
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EYen. therefore. if P. P. Thomas knew of these repre-
sentation~ at the time of the transfer of the property to 
the plaintiff~ ~ueh representations were in no way bind-
ing upon Thon1as or any of tl1e plaintiffs. They were all 
made after title had been transferred from Penrod and 
he was in no position to speak for or bind any person 
having title to the property and particularly in no posi-
tion to bind the plaintiffs or their immediate grantors. 
F nder Fnding No. 19 the court finds: 
''That plaintiffs are not bona fide purchasers 
without notice and for value of the land in issue 
and are estopped to set up the claim that the quit 
claim deeds from Utah County, conveying the land 
to defendants, are not valid against plaintiffs.'' 
'Vith regard to such finding and particularly the finding 
that the plaintiffs were not purchasers for value it is 
interesting to note the statement of the court in his memo-
randunl decision (T. 47) to the effect that: "The evi-
dence disclosing a recited consideration merely, with no 
value paid, the plaintiffg who may not have had notice of 
the defendants' claim are still not proteeted against 
the equity.'' Where in the evidence is there anything 
from which it can be concluded that "there was no value· 
paid''~ The deeds to the plaintiffs and their predecessors 
all recite a conside-ration. There is nothing to show that 
such consideration was not in fact paid and the rule cer-
tainly is that where a consideration is recited it is pre-
sumed to have been paid. The defendants did not intro-
due(' any evidence to refute such presumption and we 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
must presume that a valuable consideration was paid as 
is re<"ited in the deeds. (16, Am; Juris, p. G53). 
It appears that the court concluded that the plaintiffs 
were not purchasers for value merely because their deed 
and that of their immediate grantor recited a consider-
ation of "One Doll~r and Other Good and Valuable Con-
siderations." (R. 47-48, 55). There was no testimony that 
value was not in fact paid. The c1aim of the defendants 
that they are entitled to rely upon the representations 
allegedly made by Penrod and others was that they had 
acquired property in 1943 (Ex. 10) from James :Mikkel-
sen, who was one of the persons present at the meeting 
of the County Commissioners on June 3, 1940. It is inter-
esHng to note that this deed (Ex. 10) quotes a considera-
tion of ''One Dollar and other valuable· consideration.'' 
It is difficult to understand why the one dollar and other 
valuable considerations recited in that deed should be 
considered as a valuable consideration which would es-
tablish such documents as one upon which the defendants 
could rely and the one dollar and other valuable consider-
ations recited in the deed unde;r which the plaintiffs 
claim should be considered by the court, without any evi-
dence whatsoever, to be not a valuable consideration. 
With regard to the question of notice of the claims of the 
defendants, we have referred to that hereinabove. 
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III. 
The findings of fact do not SU]Jiplorf the conclusions of 
Law o.r the Decree. 
The court failed to make findings on all of the ma-
terial issues involved in this case. By the complaint of 
the plaintiffs it was alleged that: ''The plaintiffs as such 
partnership are the owners in fee simple of the subject 
property.'' The court made no finding whatsoever on 
the question of the plaintiffs' ownership of the property. 
The onl)~ finding made was with regard to a claimed es-
toppel as against the plaintiffs in asserting title against 
the defendants. It is our contention that such is not a 
sufficient finding upon the material issue as to plaintiffs' 
ownership. 
This court has held in many cases that in a case tried 
to the court without a jury the court must find on every 
issue, either affirmatively or negatively as the eviden0e 
may be, and thus give the defeated party an opportunity 
to assail the finding as not being supported by the evi-
dence and that a failure to find on any material issue is 
reversable error. Thomas vs Clayvon P~ano Company, 47 
Ut. 191; 151 Pac. 543. Mendelson vs. Roland, 66 Ut. 487: 
243 Pac. 798. Prows vs. Hawley, 72 Ut. 444; 271 Pac. 31. 
West vs. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Ut. 300; 17 Pac. (2) 292. 
Finding No. 15 ( T. 54) of the court referred to the 
purported statements and representations of 0. A. Pen-
rod on June 3, 1940 when a committee of residents of El-
berta and vicinity waited upon the Utah County Com-
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n11sswners, such statements purporting to have been to 
the effect that Penrod and his associates had bought all 
the lands from Utah County that they wanted and that 
the people living in and about Elberta could go ahead 
and huy the balance of the land that had been sold to 
Penrod by the Colorado Development Company and 
which had been sold to Utah County for non-payment of 
taxes. There is no evidence whatsoever that Penrod was 
associated with the plaintiffs or their immediate grantors 
at the time of the making of the statements attributed to 
him under date of June 3, 1940 and no evidence whatso-
ever that the plaintiffs or any of them or their grantors 
knew of such statements or in any way acquiesced or 
joined therein. Even if they knew of the statements hav-
ing been made there is nothing to indicate that by "his 
associa:tes'' Penrod referred to the plaintiffs or any of 
them and even if they knew of such statements they 
would have had no reason to believe that Penrod intended 
to refer to them. 
As a matter of fact it was never testified that Pen-
rod ever referred to his ''associates'' as the court found. 
What he allegedly said was that he and his "partners, 
or "~orkers'' had all the land they now desire. (T. 39). 
Certain])! there was nO'thing to tie any plaintiff in as a 
''partner'' or ''worker'' of Penrod. 
With regard to Finding No. 16 there is no evidence 
whatsoever to support such a finding. Nowhere can it be 
found from the evidence that Penrod dealt with P. P. 
Thomas, Max Thomas or Joseph Hanson or any of them 
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or any of the plaintiffs with regard to the land in quest[on 
subsequent to the tin1e Penrod deeded the land to plain-
tiffs' iJ:nmediate g-rantor on January 11, 1938. (Exhibit 
"H"). Even if there were anything· to indicate that P. P. 
Thoma~. :J[ax Thon1as and Joseph Hanson were dealing 
with Penrod and the people of Elberta and with Utah 
County in respert to these lands (which evidence is not 
in the record) it could not be concluded therefrom that 
Penrod was a partner of or so associated with the plain-
tiffs or any of them so that Penrod's statements or activi-
ties would bind the plaintiffs or put them on notice of 
anything. 
Even if perchance there were some evidence in the 
record that the plaintiffs at the time of taking the title 
had through some ~ource learned that the defendants' 
claiJ:ned an interest in the land what difference would this 
make where they also had information ,that such claims 
were invalid and had no legal force~ They owed no obli-
gation to defendants to protect defendants' interests. So 
far as the record shows they paid a valuable considera-
tion for the land and if the defendants contended that 
there was no valuable consideration paid the burden was 
on the defendants to show 'this. No evidence was intro-
duced or offered for such purpose. 
In regard to Finding No. 18 quoted above on page 13 
such certainly is not a finding of fact which might pro-
perly sup1port any conclusion of law or decree. No. 18 
is purely a conclusion of law. What'' evidence constituting 
equitable estoppel'' does the court refer to~ It is. a well 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
recognized principle of law that findings must be suffi-
ciently specific and certain as to ascertain just what is 
found and decided, without resorting to the evidence or 
the pleadings. Doe vs. Doe, 48 Ut. 200; 158 Pac. 781; 
Prows vs. Ila:tdey, 72 Ut. 444, 450; 271 Pac. 31. Certainly 
Finding No. 18 does not meet such requirement. It would 
be in1possible to make any conclusion of law from the 
broad general statmnent referred to in Finding No. 18 
because we would have to go to the transcript of the evi-
dence to try to determine what facts constituting equit-
able estoppel were referred to by the court and in that 
connection we would have no way of determining which 
evidence and which facts the court referred to thereby. 
III. (a) 
There was no competent evidence sufficient to raise an es-
toppel in defendants' favor and to thus prevent 
plaintiffs from asserting claim to the subject pro-
pe.rty or to estop pZai.ntiff s frrom attacking the vali-
dity of defendants' title. 
The courts decision and judgment in favor of the 
defendants was based entirely upon 1the conclusion of the 
court that the plaintiffs were estopped to claim the 1land 
or, to put it differently, that there were facts constituting 
an equitable estoppel in favor of the defendants so as 
to prohibit the plaintiffs fron1 asserting the validity of 
defendants' tax title. The question of estoppel was set 
up by the defendants in two causes of counterclaim. The 
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fir~t ~nrh counterclailu wa~ to the effeet that Penrod 
bought the lands in question frmn the Colorado Develop-
ment Company; that the Con1mercial Bank of Spanish 
Fork, h~- P. P. Thon1a~. its president, advanced the pur. 
chase nwney : that both a.greed to convey to ·the users 
of water the lands purchased upon the water users pay-
ment of $2500.00 which payment the water users made 
and as son1e of 8UCh water users the defendants became 
entitled to the conveyance. If we conclude that there was 
sufficient evidence to support such contention then in 
any event the most we have is a verbal promise by Pen-
rod and the Commercial Bank through its president that 
the defendants would be entitled to a conveyance of real 
property. In the first place any evidence with regard to 
such matter was inadmissible and should not have been 
permitted because it was in contravention of the statute 
of frauds. The verbal promise, to convey the land could 
not be enforced by reason of the statute of frauds, but in 
any event the most that ever was alleged or proven was 
that there was an unfullfilled promise to make a convey-
ance of real property. None of the elements of equitable 
estoppel were involved in connection with such matter 
and such principle could not be invoked with regard 
thereto. 
With regard to the other cause of counterclaim of the 
defendants the only thing of any substance whatsoever 
and the thing upon which the court seems to base its 
determination of equitable estoppel was the representa-
tions allegedly made by 0. A. Penrod on June 3, 1940 
when a committee of residents of the Elberta vicinity 
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waited upon the Utah County Commission and it was 
asserted tha:t Penrod made the statement that he and his 
associates had bought all of the land from Utah County 
that they wanted and that the people living in and about 
Elberta could go ahead and buy from the county the bal-
ance of the land that had been sold to Penrod by the 
Colorado Development Company and which had been 
sold to Utah County for non-payment of taxes. The ac-
tual testi1nony with regard to what Penrod is alleged to 
haYe said at the meeting appears on page 39 of the trans-
cript where in :Mrs. Valeria Bauer testified: "He stated 
to me that he and his partners, or workers, I do not know 
just ho\v he stated it, that was working with him had all 
the land that they now desire; that all those with water 
rights had been taken care of and if the people, so desire 
they could have all that remained.'' Certainly there was 
nothing to show that any of the plaintiffs nor the Com-
mercial Bank was "partner" or "worker" of Penrod or 
was "working with" Penrod. 
In this connection it should be borne in mind that 
the property in controversy was transferred from Pen-
rod to the Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork by quit 
claim deed dated January 11, 1938. Hence at the time 
of the alleged representa;tions and activities of Penrod 
on June 3, 1940 he did not have legal title to the property 
in controversy. The doctrine of promissory estoppel, ac-
cording to all of the authorities, is applied only in cases 
of promises or representations as to an intended aban-
donment of an existing right. (19Am. Jur. 658). This 
court has recognized the limitation of application of this 
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doctrine in the case of Elliott rs. Whitmore, 23 Ut. 342 
at 35-J. as follows: 
• · * * * Even taking these conversations in 
the most favorable view for appellant, there was 
absolutely no statement upon the part of the de-
fendants of an intended abandonrnent of an exist-
ing right * * *. It has frequently been held that 
an estoppel will not arise simply fron1 a breach of 
promise as to future conduct, or from a mere 
disappointment of expectations. The only case 
in which a representation as to the future can be 
held to operate as an estoppel is where it relates 
to an intended abandonment of an existing right..'' 
With this rule of law in mind let us examine the 
facts as established by the evidence most favorable to 
the defendants and appellees. The plaintiffs' immediate 
grantor received the property in question by quit claim 
deed from 0. A. Penrod and wife to the Commercial Bank 
of Spanish Fork, said deed being dated the 11th day of 
January, 1938. (Exhibt "H"). Subsequent to that time, 
so far as the record shows, Penrod never had any interest 
in the property in question. No where in the record is 
there anything to show, or from which an inference might 
be drawn, that the Commercial Bank oi Spanish Fork 
or for that matter any of the plaintiffs subsequent to such 
transfer had any dealing with Penrod in conne·ction with 
any project relating to the ownership of this property. 
Inasmuch as Penrod had no interest or title in the 
land in question, in so far as anything in the record ap-
pears, and so far as appears had no authority to speak 
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for the plaintiffs or plaintiffs' immediate grantor, it 
certainly could not be said that Penrod, by his statements 
and representations and actions at the meeting on June 
3, 1940 intended the abandonment of an existing right. 
Penrod had no existing right. He knew he had no existing 
right in so far as the lands in question are concerned 
because he and his wife had transferred any interest 
which he previously had by deed dated the 11th day of 
January, 1938, more than two years previous to the time 
of said meeting. We, of course, cannot speculate as to 
what Penrod's reasons might have been for making the 
statements attributed to him. But certainly the plaintiffs 
are not bound by anything which Penrod did on that date. 
This is not a situation where the acts of the grantor are 
binding upon the grantee in connection with representa-
tions concerning the title to real property. There cer-
tainly is no rule of law which prescribes that a grantee 
shall be bound -by the activities or representations of his 
grantor made after the time when the grantor has trans-
ferred title out of himself. From the time title was trans-
ferred out of Penrod his right to make representations 
of any kind with regard to the title to the property in 
question ceased and any representations which he chose 
to make ·thereafter would have no binding force or effect 
as against his grantee or the successors of such grantee. 
There having been "no existing right" .in Penrod at 
the time he made the statements and representations on 
June 3, 1940 and there being no evidence whatsoever to 
indicate that the plaintiffs or their grantor had author-
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ized Penrod to speak for them or acquiesced in his hav-
ing done ~o. there eertainly could not have been present 
the neee~~ary ele1nent~ to give rise to a prornissory es-
toppel. In the first plaee there could not have been on the 
part of Penrod an intention to abandon an existing right 
in connection with any representations made, and even 
if there had been, ~ueh could not have extended to and 
bound the plaintiffs or plaintiffs' in1mediate grantor. 
The state1nent attributable to Penrod at the meeting 
of June 3, 1940 and concerning which the witness Vale ria 
Bauer (T. 39) and the witness Earl Barney (T. 50) tes-
tified to wa::; objected to as hearsay. Not only were none 
of the plaintiffs present at the meeting when such state-
ment was allegedly made but niether were ;the defen-
dants Oren E. or Thelma Barney present. The defen-
dants, the Barneys, were not residents of nor were they 
propert~· owners in the vicinity of Elberta at or during 
an~· of the time the representations were allegedly made 
or activities carried on which they claim constituted an es-
toppel as against the plaintiffs (T. 64). They did not 
·acquire their first property in that vicinity until N ovem-
ber 13, 1940. (T. 50 and Ex. 9). Certainly none of the rep-
resentations referred to were made to the defendants and 
they had no right or reason to rely upon the· same. 
Even if there were representations made which 
might otherwise constitute an equitable estoppel (which 
was not established), nevertheless the defendants could 
not take advantage of such representations if they were 
not the persons to whom such representations were m'ade, 
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or at least of the class to which the representations were 
made. In ·this case they were neither. 
As s.tated in 19 American Juris, page 645 : ''An ad-
mission or statement will not work an estoppel if it was 
addressed to and designed soley for the information of 
another and was not intended to influence the conduct 
of the person who claims the estoppel.'' See also Kimmey 
vs. Whiton, 44 Conn. ?62, and Bell vs. The Maccabees 82 
S. W. 2nd 229. 
The on'ly evidence at all that the defendants, the Bar-
neys, ever knew of any of the alleged representations 
upon which they rely for an estoppel was the inadmiss-
ible hearsay upon hearsay which was brought out from 
the defendant, Oren E. Barney, while he was testifying as 
a witness. At page 65 of the transcript the following ap-
pears: 
"Q. Did you have any conversation with your 
father with respect to this land~ 
A. I did. 
Q. Prior to your making the purchase~ 
A. Right. 
Q. Did he make any statement to you with re-
spect to any s.tatement that had previously 
been m·ade by Mr. Penrod to hims·elf or any 
group~ 
Mr. Anderson: Just a moment. We object to 
that as calling for a conclusion of the witness. 
The Court: That objection is overruled. 
Q. You may answer. 
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A. He did. 
Q. 'Vl1a t did he ~ay? 
)[r. Anderson: Just a moment. Wish our 
general objection to go to this; and .further, 
that it is hearsay * * * '' 
''The Court: Yes. You may proceed. 
Q. (By ~Ir. Worthen) Had you had correspon-
dence with your father with respect to this 
land¥ 
A. Not this particular piece. 
Q. But I mean with respect to the land out there. 
A. The land out there, yes. He said it was up for 
sale the county had it for sale for county 
taxes. And so I sent a money order up to 
him with some money to purchase some of 
this property. That the piece I had specifi-
cally in mind, he said at the time that Penrod 
wouldn't turn loose of it for some reason, the 
piece of ground I wanted and that he was 
holding the money for. So when we come up 
in September we got in the car and come over 
here to the county auditor, don't recall 
whether recorder or auditor, and went through 
the records there. Got out the records of land 
for sale that the county had for sale out in 
that district, and they had this ground here 
up for sale at that :time. So I met with the 
county commissioners, Mr. Clark and Mr. 
Johnson and Mr. Murdock, and told them I 
would like to buy that piece of property. And 
they wanted to know what offer I would make, 
and I asked them what they wanted for the 
ground, and they said a dollar an acre. And 
I told them all right, I would like to purchase 
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it. So I n1ade application to purchase the 
ground and ·paid my down payment on the 
property at that time.'' 
It will be observed that the witness was directly 
asked and over objection permitted to answer the ques-
tion as to whether or not his father made any statements 
to hin1 with respect to statements previously made by 
J\lr. Penrod. The witness in answering such question 
never at any time stated what, if anything, he had been 
told that Penrod had done or said with regard to the 
land. The quoted excerpts from the testimony is the only 
thing in the record which would indicate any knowledge 
on the part of the defendants, the Barneys, of this al-
leged representation. There is nothing anywhere to show 
that the Barneys ever knew of the represent·ations and 
certainly there is nothing to show that at the time they 
purchased the tax titles from Utah County they ever 
knew of such alleged representations or i£ they did that 
they relied upon said representations or if they did so 
rely that they thereupon changed their position to their 
detriment. With this state of the record we would have 
to resort to the highest degree of speculation to conclude 
that the defendants, the Barneys, ever knew of the rep-
resentations or reLied thereon in connection with their 
purchase of the property. The whole truth of the matter 
is that they did not so rely but mere·ly purchased tax 
titles in the regular course of dealing believing that they 
were ·complying with the statutes and were buying good 
tax titles. When 1they later learned that the tax titles 
were defective defendants had to search for and if neces-
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sary invent son1e means of endeavoring to defe'at the good 
and valid title of the plaintiffs. It is obviou's from the 
record that at the tin1e the defendants, the Barneys, pur-
chased the tax titles frmn Utah County they did not know 
of nor did they have in mind any representations with 
regard to sue.h property, or affecting the same, which 
might have been 1na.de by Penrod or by any plain:tiff or 
any one authorized to speak for the plaintiffs. 
Furthermore the record is absolutely void of evi-
dence to indicate that any person under whom the defen-
dants, the Barneys, cl~im any rights in connection with 
this property ever relied upon any representations of 
the plaintiffs, or anyone authorized to act for them and 
upon such reliance changed their position to their detri-
ment. 
In fact the defendants have failed entirely to esta-
blish any of ;the necessary elements to constitute an equit-
able estoppel as against the plaintiffs. 
Certainly if an estoppel were to be found in favor 
of the defendants, the Barneys, it would have to be pre-
dicated upon circumstances existing at the time they ac-
quired their interest in the property in controversy, 1that 
is on November 3, 1941, because nowhere is it alleged 
or rproven that the plaintiffs or Penrod or anyone alleged-
ly in position to act or speak for the plaintiffs did any-
thing or made any representrutions subsequent to that 
time on which an estoppel could be predicated. The de-
fendants, the Barneys, were not of the class of people to 
whom any of the representations were allegedly made 
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and on N ov·ember 3, 1941, such defendants· had not ae-
quired any inte.rest from any person who was of that 
class so as to be in a position to claim privity. It was 
not until 1943 that the defendants, the Barneys, acquired 
some property from Mikkelson (which property was not 
that here in controversy) (Ex. 10). They cannot then 
rely upon the interest purchased in 1943 to relate back 
and affect the purchase by them of the property in con-
troversy some two years before. 
They never attended any meeting when any of the 
representations were made upon which they rely for es-
toppel; they were not of the class to whom any of sucll 
representations were allegedly made; 1there is no evidence 
whatsoever that they ever knew of any such repTesenta-
tions when they acquired any of their property or when 
they made any purchaHe of tax titles from the county and 
certainly therefore it could not be concluded that they re-
lied upon any such representations to their detriment. 
CONCLUSION 
The sum and substance of the e~dence and testi-
mony presented in this case shows that the pl·aintiffs re-
ceived the title to the land in contr1oversy through various 
deeds, the validity of which are undisputed. The answer-
ing defendants, Oren E. Barney and Thelma Barney, 
received quit claim deeds from Utah County covering the 
property in question which deeds were admittedly in-
valid. There was no evidence or testimony sufficient to 
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raise an equitable estoppel as against the plaintiffs a.nd 
in favor of the defendants. 
~: We respectfully submit that the decision of the lower 
~ court should be reversed and the case remanded for a 
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